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Guest Editors’ Introduction
LUCIA BOLDRINI AND FLORIAN MUSSGNUG
‘Qui vit sans folie n’est pas si sage qu’il croit’1
‘I shall have to speak of things of which I cannot speak’, writes Samuel
Beckett in The Unnameable, ‘but also, which is even more interesting, but
also that I, which is if possible even more interesting, that I shall have to,
I forget, no matter’.2 Listening to the voice of folly can be like this: an
endless flow of inconsistencies, of contradictions, sayings and unsayings;
a tantalizing, mischievous mockery of speech – unable to go on, unable to
end. And yet – as this volume shows –we are irresistibly drawn to folly,
its promises, its whispers of ‘even more interesting’ things: of how we
are split between conscious and unconscious, familiar and unfamiliar,
same and other. For psychoanalysis, folly is not only a site of hidden
truths; it is also, perhaps more importantly, a source of unconscious
freedom, a momentary escape from our obsession with rules and order.3
According to Christopher Bollas, the unconscious self is like a fool who
‘raises potentially endless questions about diverse and disparate issues’
and thereby provides us with a ‘separate sense’, which opens us to others
and to our own creative potential.4 As Rachel Bowlby elegantly puts
it in ‘ “Where Ignorance is Bliss”: The Folly of Origins in Gray and
Hardy’, folly is a ‘soul-mole’, forever shovelling our secrets out into the
light: ‘there’s no possible moment of release or resignation when the
mole might stop vainly, interminably working away’ (p. 272). Folly’s
subversive, creative soliloquies reveal to us a psychic ‘underground
repertoire of secrets’; they challenge our established knowledge and invite
us, as Bowlby shows, to endless, titillating games of ‘suppression and
confession’ (p. 271). For Anne Duprat, this deep-seated playfulness
explains folly’s close relation to fiction: as she explains in ‘Stultitia
loquitur: Fiction and Folly in Early Modern Literature’, what makes
them so alike is their ‘capacity of creating alternative representations
of the world – and thus of re-figuring the world depicted by reason
or history – [. . . ] but also their paradoxical structure, and hence the
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instability of their speech acts, which deny, suspend, or do not seriously
guarantee the truth of their statements’ (p. 141).
From a different point of view – that of Michel Foucault’s momentous
Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique – folly is the excluded other, a
being without a voice.5 If subject formation depends, as Foucault
suggests, on the power of normalizing discourse, folly is what is
excluded from the ‘imprisoning frame’ of subjectivity.6 Its condition of
marginality, however, is an unlikely locus of resistance or transgression:
as a meaningless spectre, déraison lacks the subversive powers of
discursively constituted identity. As Judith Butler explains, ‘if we
understand power as forming the subject [. . . ], as providing the very
condition of its existence and the trajectory of its desire, then power
is not simply what we oppose but also, in a strong sense, what we
depend on for our existence and what we harbour and preserve in
the beings that we are’.7 According to this theory, folly – the complete
absence of discursive power –marks the ultimate boundaries of our
existence. It is the ungraspable and irreducible other – defiant of every
order of representation –which endlessly resists comprehension and
assimilation.
How does literature capture folly’s voice – and how does it answer its
silence? Isn’t the marginality of folly, its unassailable non-assimilability,
precisely what gives literature its disruptive force? According to
Foucault, modern art is inextricably linked to madness, not as a subject
matter, but as a model for the artist’s absolute break with social
convention. Duprat shows that folly was central to the development
of early modern theories of fiction, with all the ambiguities that
sustain its structure and endow it with a dangerous potential for
heterodoxy, while in ‘Literature and the Politics of Madness: On
the Twentieth-Century Reception of Friedrich Hölderlin in France
and Germany’, Shane Weller explains that modern literature and
philosophy’s fascination with folly – their concern with madness as the
reiterated presence of an absence – is nowhere more apparent than
in the widespread admiration for Friedrich Hölderlin’s self-negating
and self-abolishing verse. For Foucault, and for a host of eminent
twentieth-century thinkers, Hölderlin exemplifies the artist’s deliberate
withdrawal from meaning: writing as a final and most extreme form
of resistance to nihilism. Hölderlin, ‘a decisive figure in the history of
madness’, thus inaugurates a new epoch in which madness becomes a
necessary – but possibly empty – centre to our many debates between
literature, aesthetics, philosophy and politics (p. 193).
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Several essays in this collection tell us of modern writers and artists
who are overcome by the dread of folly evoked in Foucault’s history.
When Georg Christoph Lichtenberg sets out to write a commentary
on William Hogarth’s engravings, he is shocked and literally silenced
by the artist’s depiction of Bedlam. As Friederike Felicitas Günther
argues in ‘Explanations on the Edge of Reason: Lichtenberg’s Difficulties
Describing Hogarth’s View of Bedlam’, the harrowing solitude of the
mad and their irredeemable exclusion from society cast a long shadow
on Enlightenment dreams of a universal morality based on reason and
common sense. More than a century later, Joseph Conrad’s Marlow – one
of three European travellers discussed in Kai Mikkonen’s contribution to
this volume – is overwhelmed by the ‘great silence’ of the impenetrable
African forest and almost petrified by the ‘vengeful aspect’ of this
terrifying mask of otherness, whose enigmatic gaze he cannot endure.8
For the protagonist of Gogol’s ‘The Overcoat’, Akaky Akakievich, whose
life was almost literally lived between the lines of writing that it was
his job daily to copy, the new overcoat, obtained with great sacrifice,
signals the collapse of the monotony of everyday life and, almost literally,
a deviation from ‘straight’ normality and a descent into delirium.9 In
his classic study The Lonely Voice, Frank O’Connor reads Akaky’s
parable as representative of the short story’s concern, as a genre, with
the ‘little people’, the marginal, the ‘submerged population group’ that
remain unrepresented in mainstream literary forms, such as the epic
and its heir, the novel10 – almost as if the short story, and this story in
particular, were the embodiment of what folly, madness, déraison signify:
the impossibility of being accounted for through the ‘straight lines’ of
rational explanations and social integration. In Virginia Woolf ’s Mrs
Dalloway, Septimus Warren Smith also finds himself forced into silence:
he is emarginated, humiliated and confined within inflexible lines – those
of modern British social class, of high-handed professionals with their
supposedly superior and indisputable knowledge, but also of the trenches
in which Septimus was struck by shell-shock and which are, in many
ways, the aberrant outcome of modern rationalism. In her analysis of
Woolf ’s Russian models, ‘Red Flowers and a Shabby Coat: Russian
Literature and the Presentation of “Madness” in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs
Dalloway’, Caroline Lusin shows that the representation of madness
in Mrs Dalloway – a representation that is always linked with social
criticism – should not be seen simply as a projection of the author’s own
biographical experience. Through her interest in foreign literary models
Woolf reminds us that ‘we all come from under Gogol’s overcoat’: we are
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all, in some ways, affected by delirium and madness, by a sense of our
own marginality, which power tries to suppress, but which will not be
bent, and which, like Akaky, comes back to haunt the living and to seek
redress from them.
And yet, silence and repression are not the most common literary
response to the spectacle of folly. Where the rule of reason seeks
to banish folly, literature guides us to the uncanny boundaries of
the psyche where new powerful fantasies may flourish. Emblematic
figures of otherness –monstrous madmen, crafty fools, mythical agents
of divine power – turn our attention away from the abstract categories
of reason and to the singular other, who responds, in turn, to the
singular otherness in each of us. From its earliest beginnings, the
Western tradition portrays folly in a double light – as monstrous and
divine. Wild satyrs and maenads spread frenzy, disorder and death in
Euripides’ The Bacchae, while Aeschylus’ Oresteia shows us a terrified
Orestes, pursued by the merciless Erinyes, whose duty it is to punish
violence with madness. As Vladimir Zoric´ remarks in his insightful
discussion of paranoia and exile in ‘The Furies of Orestes: Constructing
Persecutory Agency in Narratives of Exile’, the threat of punishment and
unremitting persecution is real, even where its supernatural executioners
seem to arise from the underworlds of the mind: from a contemporary,
post-Freudian point of view, Zoric´ explains, the ‘vicious conspiracy
of powerful transcendental agents’ can be described as a construction
of the ‘imaginative resources set free by the protagonists’ dislocation’
(p. 187, p. 184).
Divine intervention can be a source of awe as well as awfulness. In his
reflections on ‘The Folly of Poetry’, Piero Boitani reminds us that for
Plato manía is a gift of the gods, a frenzy that descends from sublime
heights, arousing and inspiring the soul. In the Phaedrus, Socrates
distinguishes between four manifestations of divine furor: divination,
ritual, amorous folly and –most importantly – furor poeticus, ‘the madness
of those who are possessed by the Muses; which taking hold of a delicate
and virgin soul, and there inspiring frenzy, awakens lyrical and all other
numbers; with these adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for
the instruction of posterity’.11 Without such frenzy, Boitani remarks, no
poet – from Parmenides to Torquato Tasso – could have gained access
to the temple of the Muses: ‘If even a Roman senator, a politician and
statesman [Horace], knew that poets could only be good if inspired by
furor, then the madness of poetry must have been common knowledge’
(p. 125).
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Where poetry truly seeks to give voice to madness, Boitani writes,
the reader hears ‘unspeakable grief, a soul tortured to the point of no
return’ (p. 137). Furor can easily turn into fury, sheer madness, mania,
an uncanny excess of language. And if the poet is a vehicle for a power
that transcends him (for Tasso, the poet inspired by divine furor may
‘think and speak in a different mind and a different tongue than his own’,
p. 136), all poetic writing may be seen as a form of ‘speaking in tongues’.
In ‘Glossolalic Folly’, Anne Tomiche reminds us that glossolalia has
often been associated with transcendental meaning and the power of
revelation precisely because of its lack of (human) meaning. In the
nineteenth century, the revelatory folly of ‘speaking in tongues’ became
an object of scientific study, especially in relation to spiritual phenomena
and the human mind. But, as Tomiche shows, glossolalia, which is
frequently associated with the psychopathology of hysteria, eludes the
categories of nineteenth-century psychiatrists and linguists. Scientific
reason tries to frame what would escape it, but in so doing it exposes the
scientist’s hidden desires. Glossolalia can therefore be seen as a ‘return’
of the body, an emphasis on that which is excluded from linguistic
definitions: in twentieth-century literary explorations of glossolalia,
linguistic folly acquires a variety of new meanings, which manifest
themselves in the rich materiality of language itself and in its ‘play
between total unintelligibility and full revelation’ (p. 174).
Traditional associations of madness with the female body –which
underlie nineteenth-century discussions of folly and the typically
feminine condition of hysteria – are shown by Laura Jose to operate
also in medieval medical texts, where, contrary perhaps to our modern
expectations, they reveal ‘an intriguing level of gender fluidity’ (p. 153).
The link between female reproductive sexuality and male rationality,
writes Jose in ‘Monstrous Conceptions: Sex, Madness and Gender in
Medieval Medical Texts’, is based on the ability to conceive – children,
or thought. Medieval medical texts assume a structural similarity
between uterus and brain: if either the female sexual organs or the
male mind functions incorrectly, aberrations –monstrous offspring,
madness – inevitably ensue. Despite this apparent endorsement of
dichotomous gender roles, however, medieval descriptions of the female
body and its diseases also convey, implicitly, men’s fear of their own
mysterious and fragile bodies and their own vulnerability. It is, once
again, the encounter with matter – unrepresentable, intractable – that
upsets the sense of security apparently grounded in (man’s) reason. Folly
unsettles the rational mind and threatens any system that is based on
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clear distinctions, because – as Günther also observes of Lichtenberg – an
exhaustive description of déraison would entail the understanding of, the
possibility of identification with, and therefore the admission of one’s
own liability to madness.
If folly cannot be represented by reason, madness and delirium
may appear to be superior forms of expression and of perception,
precisely because they stand outside normal and normative social
practice. Surrealism, as Jacqueline Rattray shows through her ‘Analysing
Surrealist Madness Through the Poetry of Salvador Dalí’, actively
explores madness as a state that enables new critical perceptions and
that allows the artist to see the insane as marginalized, oppressed victims
of society, thereby acquiring a critical social role. In Dali’s writing,
a quick succession of bewildering, apparently unrelated images, aims
to bring about changes of perception in the reader. Dali’s ‘paranoiac-
critical’ method draws from the delirious imagination in order to
provoke a jolt to normal perception: madness is a method with a
critical function as well as (or even before being) a condition. French
Symbolism – the topic of Natasha Grigorian’s ‘Dreams, Nightmares,
and Lunacy in En rade: Odilon Redon’s Pictorial Inspiration in the
Writings of J.–K. Huysmans’ – similarly rejects the rational order of
bourgeois society by privileging the non-rational world of dream, fantasy
and sensation. Unlike Dali’s surrealism, however, the works of J.–K.
Huysmans and Odilon Redon convey a melancholic, anguished sense
of loss and nostalgia, even where their images suggest violence. While
Dali’s surrealism is concerned with the fragmenting of perception, with
the body, its secretions, putrefaction, and the bodily effects that such
images elicit in the reader, Huysmans and Redon’s nightmarish and often
grotesque images attribute a deeper, symbolic coherence to lunacy. As
Grigorian shows, Huysmans’s En rade is based on a sequence of intensely
symbolic scenes, which celebrate the dreamlike, nostalgic desire for a
lost, idealized or impossible dimension, while at the same time assuming
the heuristic function of art, its ability to bring the subject closer to an
understanding of herself or himself.
In their essays on visual and poetic representations of madness,
Günther, Grigorian and Rattray realize what Malcolm Bowie once
described as perhaps the most important task of comparative criticism:
the study of the creative transaction between different artistic practices
‘under the twin signs of dynamism and complexity’.12 If read in succe-
ssion, the three essays suggest a progression from the Enlightenment’s
deep-rooted fears of madness to late-nineteenth-century concerns with
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symbolism and with folly as a lost knowledge that can only be evoked
through non-rational representation and perception. Finally, in the early
twentieth century, the search for a truth beyond reason culminates in
the avant-garde’s bold display of delirium and paranoia: strategies to
unsettle the complacency of bourgeois conventionality. Yet this is only
one way of reading the essays in this collection: for Günther, Grigorian
and Rattray, but also for Lusin and Mikkonen, madness is what resists
the operations of an externally framing and normalizing ideal. It is the
menacing or simply pitiful spectacle of a subject excluded from power,
or else the romanticized ideal of a rebellious other, which exceeds the
bounds of any and all regulatory schemas. But what if power itself turns
out to be a collective madness? What if our social regulations, our daily
rituals of conformity reveal themselves to be the greatest of follies?
The suspicion of a world based on déraison pervades many of the
essays in this collection. As Bowlby reminds us, ‘it was in the eighteenth
century that folly had its verbal heyday, just at the time when tangible,
material follies were beginning to pop up on the ground in every odd
corner of the well-acred English gentleman’s estate’ (p. 271). But already
the sixteenth century showed more than a passing interest in madness:
‘from the mad character (Orlando) through the mad author (Tasso) to
the mad reader (Don Quixote)’, writes Duprat, ‘folly seemed to invade
the whole world’ (p. 142). And what about the twentieth century? Bank
clerks, insurance agents, university professors, ‘the great poets of the
past century were at best eccentrics’, quips Boitani: ‘But then, it is not
they but the world that has gone mad’ (p. 138). In his learned and
humorous essay on ‘Bibliomania and the Folly of Reading’, Bernhard
Metz sets out to blur the boundaries between cultural establishment
and subversive eccentricity. The bibliomaniac is the scholar’s necessary
counterpart: his eccentricity embodies our hidden desires and bad habits.
‘In a way’, Metz admits, ‘we’re all book fools’ (p. 263). Does this mean
that folly is little more than a peculiar inclination, an unacknowledged
but widespread and irresistible habit? Is Rachel Bowlby right to suggest
that there are times when folly is ‘at once idiosyncrasy and a universal
state. It’s the peculiarities and shameful appetites, the childish or animal
compulsions that each person is unaware of in themselves, even though
they may be adept at spotting them in others’ (p. 272)? In the final
essay of this volume, ‘The New Praise of Folly’, Alberto Manguel
reaches a different, more sinister conclusion. For the Argentinian writer,
true folly is unintelligible, tragic and all-pervasive. It manifests itself
in our cruelties and man-made catastrophes, in the unpredictable and
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inexplicable force of our greed, our violence and our wilful cruelty.
There are deeds that bear no rational explanation, experiences that
cannot be told, but only suffered ‘in the flesh and in the mind’. And
yet, tales must be told about them that allow for a certain, limited
understanding. ‘Through language at its best, our folly can be trapped in
its own doings, made to repeat itself, made to enact its cruelties and
catastrophes (and even its glorious deeds) but this time under lucid
observation and with protected emotion, beneath the aseptic covering of
words, lit by the reading-lamp set over the open book’ (p. 325).
In his history of madness, Foucault describes insanity as the ‘charred
root of meaning’.13 Meaning sprouts not only from reason but from
folly, even when reason attempts to create a ‘scorched earth’ around
itself to sterilize anything that does not conform to it. Of this charring,
this scorching, this attempted auto-da-fé that would suppress or contain
the heterodoxy of meaning, there are many examples in literature:
from Don Quijote, where the books that lead to folly are finally burned
(with Quijote’s return to normality, but also at the cost of his life), to
Hanif Kureishi’s The Black Album, where it is Salman Rushdie’s The
Satanic Verses that suffers this fate during a demonstration. Despite
their different historical, national and ideological contexts, both burnings
testify to the desire to sterilise any heterodox voices, any perspectives
that would introduce a doubt, an alternative, to what is reputed to be
true. Even our most intimate and personal beliefs – our family histories
and our ‘normal’ knowledge of origins, ‘roots’ and backgrounds – depend
on such confining gestures: on a repression of the buried secrets and
hidden truths, which Bowlby lucidly reveals in her discussion of Thomas
Hardy. As the essays in this volume show, folly is a serious disturbance to
such established truths, and folly operates to chip away at confinements
and orthodoxies, to confuse the lines that would define and delimit
any subject. In her discussion of literature, philosophy and madness,
Shoshana Felman writes that ‘the paradox of madness’ is precisely that
‘of being literary in philosophy and philosophical in literature’.14 The
root may be charred, but it continues to sprout meaning.
The articles gathered in this double issue of Comparative Critical
Studies are a selection of the papers that were presented at the
BCLA’s Eleventh International Conference, ‘Folly’, held at Goldsmiths
University of London, in July 2007. About one hundred and twenty
papers were discussed there, tackling topics as diverse as the folly of
women, representations of the Ship of Fools, madness in Eastern Europe
in the Soviet period, garden follies and mausolea, carnival and violence
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in modern Asia, reason and unreason in the Western philosophical
tradition, melancholy, laughter and satire. Selecting papers from such
a range has been an invidious task, but also one to be envied. Listening
to the papers in London last year and reading their elaborated versions
thereafter, we have learned a lot, laughed a lot, and gone a little mad.
How does one combine such a range of topics with the coherence that is
expected from a monograph? More than once, the appeal of academic
rigour seemed to fade in comparison with the lively, playful, joyful,
adventurous, sometimes bizarre but always enlightening contributions
that the topic of folly invited. Fortunately, we could rely on lucid help
from the editors of Comparative Critical Studies, on guidance from our
peer reviewers and, most importantly, from the authors themselves:
Boitani’s absorbing lecture taught us that poetry and folly are entwined
from the start with a touch of the divine, while the love of books (which
is not necessarily a love of literature) has more than a touch of madness,
as Metz reminds us. After all, Don Quijote’s brain was liquiefied by
the sun of La Mancha and his reading of romances. Perhaps, alongside
the customary disclaimer that any reference to real people and events is
purely coincidental, all books should carry a more general mental health
warning: Reader Beware.
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